From a Ukrainian Expert: a Guide to Swatting Down Shahed Drones
What works and what doesn't
Russia’s Shahed attack drones are relentlessly pummeling Ukrainian cities. Defeating the 440-pound, propeller-driven drones, each of which ranges thousands of miles with a 200-pound warhead, is “the highest priority” in Kyiv, according to Taras Tymochko, a representative of the Ukrainian Come Back Alive foundation.
One Ukrainian electronic-warfare developer, “Alchemist,” ranked the counter-Shahed defenses by effectiveness. Jamming words, Alchemist claimed—although to be fair, Alchemist does head a jamming team, the Kyiv-based Night Watch. So they may be biased.
Fast-firing autocannon vehicles and installations work, too. Anti-drone interceptor drones can work—if they’re fast enough.
Helicopters are middling defenses. Mobile gun teams—guys in trucks with machine guns—simply don’t work anymore. And heavy, expensive air-defense systems such as the Patriot and IRIS-T are unsuitable owing to their cost.
The way forward should be clear, if you believe Alchemist. More jammers. Faster interceptor drones. And many more autocannons on vehicles such as the Cold War-vintage, German-made Gepard. (Watch a Gepard engage a Shahed in the video at top.)
The scale of the problem is daunting. “Over three years of war, Russia has launched tens of thousands of Shahed drones: around 29,000 according to Ukrainian analysts,” Alchemist wrote in a dossier for Trench Art.
An attack on July 4 involved 539 Shaheds and decoy Shaheds, according to the Ukrainian air force. The air force claimed it shot down 268 of the drones, while another 208 flew off course, likely owing to Ukrainian E.W. systems such as Night Watch’s that can jam the radio signals connecting the Russian drones to their navigation satellites.
Despite the defensive effort, 63 Shaheds struck, damaging buildings and killing and wounding civilians. Six days later, 397 Shaheds flew in. Twenty-nine got through. Two days after that, 597 Shaheds and decoys droned toward Ukraine. The Ukrainians shot down or misdirected 577 of them. Twenty hit.
All those shoot-downs don’t discourage the Russians. “The Kremlin is willing to lose many Shaheds—about 75% of attacks fail—because mass waves are designed to exhaust air-defense systems,” Alchemist noted.
“Since September 2024, Russia has drastically increased its launch tempo—from several hundred to more than a thousand drones per week,” they added. “This means regular night attacks that severely drain defense resources, with hundreds of Shahed launches occurring weekly.”
“There is also a systematic intensification of strikes on Ukraine’s critical infrastructure—including energy facilities, transport networks, command nodes and logistics hubs.”
As bad as the Shahed raids are now, they could get much worse. “Russia continues to improve its Shahed tactics and deployment technologies,” Alchemist explained. “New reconnaissance UAVs mimicking a Shahed’s appearance are launched ahead of time to scan flight paths and identify air-defense systems. These data are then used to optimize Shahed flight plans and increase their accuracy.”
There’s also a new jet-propelled Shahed that travels as fast as 370 miles per hour—nearly double the speed of the prop-driven model. The higher speed has the effect of “making interception far more difficult,” Alchemist wrote. “In such cases, interceptor drones can no longer respond effectively, so missile systems are required.”
Shahed production is expanding even as Ukrainian drones target the factories. “Estimates suggest that by early 2024, Russia was producing around 500 Shaheds per month, and by fall this figure had grown significantly,” Alchemist wrote. “Russia is also reportedly planning to bring in over 25,000 North Korean workers to expand its manufacturing plants. All signs indicate the threat will continue to escalate.”
Greater production volumes mean lower prices. A Shahed once cost as much as $200,000. Today, one of the drones may set the Kremlin back just $50,000—or even less. That’s a serious problem for the Ukrainian defense ministry, as a strategic jamming complex might cost more than $1 million and a heavy anti-air missile could cost $1 million or a few hundred thousand dollars.
What works. What doesn’t.
“A multi-layered defense strategy is required, where the cost of interception must be lower than the drone’s value,” Alchemist wrote. “Conventional surface-to-air missiles—Patriot, IRIS-T et cetera—technically shoot down Shaheds but are vastly more expensive.”
Other countermeasures are more cost-effective.
First-person-view interceptor drones: “A fast-evolving field,” according Alchemist. “Each interceptor costs around $1,000 to $5,000. Over 100 Shaheds have already been destroyed using these drones. However, their effectiveness drops sharply against high-speed, jet-powered Shaheds. They have limited flight time, are sensitive to weather conditions and battery efficiency declines in cold weather.”
Strategic electronic warfare: “For example, Ukraine’s integrated Lima system”—which Alchemist helps develop—“effectively jams Shahed navigation and redirects them from targets. E.W. deployment over cities has offered nearly complete protection for months.” The problem for E.W. developers is that most current jammers have just four or eight channels for blocking different frequencies. “But Russia is now using 12-plus channel variants,” Alchemist noted. “Upgrading to defend against these will require time for production, installation, and deployment of next-generation jamming equipment.”
Anti-aircraft guns: “Automated 35-millimeter gun systems produce dense projectile clouds,” Alchemist pointed out. “A German Gepard with twin 35-millimeter Oerlikon [autocannons] once shot down multiple drones with a single burst. Rheinmetall’s modern Skynex system, with an Oerlikon Mk. 3 gun, has also performed flawlessly in drone interception.”
Shoulder-fired anti-air missiles: “Useful for close-range engagements, but their effectiveness is dependent on human operators, especially at night or against maneuvering targets, and each missile is still more expensive than a Shahed.”
Mobile fire teams with .50-caliber machine guns: “Effective early in the war, but became largely ineffective after Russia raised Shahed altitudes beyond their reach.”
Helicopters with machine guns and thermal imagers: “These can act as mobile interceptors but are highly weather-dependent—their performance degrades under cloud cover, fog, wind and poor visibility.”
“These tools must complement each other,” Alchemist stressed. “Strategic E.W. is the key component, anti-aircraft guns provide critical mid-range defense and FPV drones help relieve pressure when deployed at scale. The ideal solution blends cost-effective systems with existing missile defenses—preserving the economic balance in favor of defenders.”
Read more:
Hammered by 2,700 Drones in a Month, Ukraine Is Losing the Shahed War
In three years, Russia has launched 28,734 Shahed attack drones at Ukrainian positions and cities.