How Did the Emirates End Up with the World's Best F-16s?
Embarrassed in 1986, Abu Dhabi was determined to defend itself
by PAUL IDDON
In a brief and largely forgotten episode of the Iran-Iraq War, Iranian warplanes attacked Emirati oilfields off the coast of the United Arab Emirates’ capital, Abu Dhabi.
Stunned by its utter powerlessness in the face of that strike, the UAE set to work building a military in the ensuing decades so that it would not find itself in such a vulnerable position again. For a while, it even operated the world’s best Lockheed Martin F-16 fighters.
On Nov. 25, 1986, air-launched missiles struck two oil platforms, 100 miles from the Emirati capital. The missiles hit the production unit of one platform and the living quarters of the other, killing five and injuring at least 24. Abu Dhabi only acknowledged that a lone “foreign aircraft” executed the deadly attack.
The following month, investigative journalists Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta reported that the Emirati government had no doubt Iran carried out the attack—the deadliest against a noncombatant state in the eight-year Iran-Iraq War. However, Abu Dhabi felt powerless to do anything about it.
“The reason the UAE doesn’t want to challenge Iran is that the Maine-sized group of seven oil-rich sheikdoms is inherently fearful, weak and helpless, afraid of the ayatollah’s terrorists and powerless before his military might,” Anderson and Van Atta wrote. They noted that the UAE had little more than a handful of American Hawk anti-aircraft and French Exocet anti-ship missiles in its arsenal to resist any Iranian military attacks.
Not long later, the UAE began building up one of the most advanced and diversified military arsenals in the region. Its preference for building a eclectic arsenal arguably had roots in that specific attack, or at least reinforced it.
In the immediate aftermath of the Iranian strike, the UAE requested Stinger shoulder-fired anti-air missiles from the United States. Washington declined, so Abu Dhabi turned to the Soviet Union for equivalent missiles, an early demonstration to the United States that it had viable alternatives for any weapons Washington refused to sell.
Abu Dhabi’s defense buildup would intensify in the 1990s after a new regional threat emerged, this time from the north. Even before Saddam Hussein’s army infamously invaded and annexed Kuwait, Abu Dhabi’s ruler at the time, Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahyan, took the Iraqi leader’s threats seriously and requested American support.
The U.S. discreetly dispatched two Boeing KC-135 aerial tankers on July 24, 1990, more than a week before Iraq invaded Kuwait, enabling the Emirati air force’s modest fleet of French-built fighter jets to patrol its air space against potential Iraqi threats.
After Saddam’s forcible removal from Kuwait by the U.S.-led coalition, the UAE went on a weapons shopping spree, importing only the best military equipment money could buy.
The current ruler of Abu Dhabi, Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, commanded the Emirati air force in 1991. Aside from acquiring French-made Dassault Mirage 2000 fighters, it remained a relatively modest force five years after Iran’s attack.
However, when the 29-year-old prince visited Washington that year, he requested so much military hardware that Congress worried about the potential risks for fragile Middle Eastern stability. Such concerns quickly abated. Abu Dhabi would commence a truly enormous military buildup for such a small country.
Diverse weapons
The UAE sought quality armaments in significant quantities. In 1998, it persuaded the U.S. to develop a new version of the F-16, the F-16E/F Block 60, which was more advanced than the F-16s then flown by the U.S. Air Force. It was an unprecedented deal for its time.
The Block 60s remain formidable fighter jets through to the present day, 20 years after the first deliveries. Abu Dhabi acquired 80.
At the same time it negotiated that deal, the Emiratis also ordered 30 Mirage 2000-9 fighters from France, in keeping with their policy of maintaining a diverse arsenal. Decades later in 2021, the Emirates ordered 80 Dassault Rafales from Paris after rejecting U.S. preconditions for acquiring 50 Lockheed Martin F-35 stealth fighters.
The UAE also became the only foreign operator of France’s Leclerc main battle tank, acquiring 390 between 1994 and 2006. During the same decade, it received additional military hardware from Russia, including more than 600 BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles.
The UAE has also established a well-equipped and formidable multilayered air defense system through several acquisitions. From the United States, it acquired the Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense systems, both far more advanced systems than the Stingers Washington denied Abu Dhabi in 1986.
Again, abiding by its principle of diversification, the UAE also acquired several medium-range Pantsir-S1 mobile air defense systems from Russia. More recently, it ordered medium-range Korean Medium-range Surface-to-Air Missile systems, or KM-SAMs, from South Korea.
While no doubt an impressive buildup, the UAE still relies on the U.S. for some capabilities it lacks. For example, during the unprecedented missile and drone attacks against Abu Dhabi by the Houthis in Yemen in January 2022, the UAE concluded it needed its F-16s and Mirage 2000s conducting round-the-clock air patrols to detect and intercept any additional incoming drones.
The U.S. subsequently deployed KC-135s to the UAE’s Al Dhafra air base to refuel the fighters. However, the U.S. military later offended the Emirati leadership by promptly handing them a bill for this assistance while they were still reeling from what they described as their 9/11.
Although the Emirati air force has significantly expanded in size and sophistication since 1990, it still needed USAF tankers in 2022. Nevertheless, the UAE’s overall military capabilities today are much greater than when Abu Dhabi shuddered under Iranian attack in 1986.
The American THAAD even made its combat debut in Emirati service, intercepting one of those Houthi ballistic missiles fired at Abu Dhabi in January 2022. (See video above.) While the UAE may need some assistance in the face of future threats, it’s unlikely to find itself as utterly powerless as it was in 1986.
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